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Although I am pleased to have provoked such thoughtful com-
ments from my colleague,' I do not agree that his objections to the
thesis of my recent Yale Law Journal article2 are either slight or margi-
nal. I append this brief note to clarify the extent of the disagreement.
There are, to be sure, important points on which we agree. We
agree, for example, that it would not be inappropriate for a constitu-
tional convention to consider but a single subject and to propose a sin-
gle corrective amendment.3
We differ quite sharply, however, with respect to a critical ques-
tion: who is empowered to control a constitutional convention? Pro-
fessor Van Alstyne has suggested that a group of applying state
legislatures may dictate to a constitutional convention the exact text of
the amendment the convention is to "propose" (if it takes any action at
all). I have argued, on the contrary, that the "Convention for propos-
ing Amendments" 4 is granted final authority under article V to define
the issues to be addressed and to determine the nature and text of any
amendments to be proposed for ratification.
I need not recount in detail the arguments I have previously set
forth in support of this conclusion. Drawing upon the debates at the
Constitutional Convention of 1787, I argued that the convention mode
was created to provide a method of proposing amendments that was an
alternative to proposal by Congress, but independent as well of the
state legislatures.5 I suggested that the framers' rejection of a draft plan
that would have permitted state legislatures to propose, as well as to
ratify, amendments was in part a reflection of the concern expressed by
Hamilton and others that "[t]he State Legislatures will not apply for
* Professor of Law, Duke University. A.B. 1963, University of North Carolina; LL.B.
1966, Yale University.
1. Van Alstyne, The Limited Constitutional Convention-The Recurring.4nswer, 1979 DUKE
L.J. 985.
2. Dellinger, The Recurring Question of the "Limited" Constitutional Convention, 88 YALE
L.J. 1623 (1979).
3. For a contrary view, see Ackerman, Unconstitutional Convention, NEw REPUBLIC, Mar. 3,
1979, at 8.
4. U.S. CONsT. art. V.
5. See Dellinger, supra note 2, at 1624-30.
DUKE LAW JOURIVAL
alterations but with a view to increase their own powers .... ,,6 By
substituting a constitutional convention for the state legislatures as a
body to propose amendments, the drafters created an alternative pro-
posing mechanism free of both the possible self-interest of Congress
and the potential parochialism of the state legislatures. By leaving to
the states the final authority to ratify all amendments, the framers care-
fully divided the power to amend the Constitution between state and
national interests.
Professor Van Alstyne's narrow reading of the authority of a con-
stitutional convention is reflected in his recurring references to the con-
vention method as the "state mode' 7 of proposing amendments. But
there is no "state mode" for proposing amendments created by article
V; it provides, on the contrary, for a "Convention for proposing
Amendments." 8 The phrase "state mode" is one which, as far as I can
ascertain, was never used at the Philadelphia Convention. There was
considerable discussion of the need for a method of proposing amend-
ments that was independent of Congress. The alternative chosen, how-
ever, was proposal by a national convention, and not proposal by state
legislatures.
If I am correct that a "Convention for proposing Amendments"
has the final authority to determine what amendments to propose, how
should Congress treat state legislative applications that may errone-
ously presume to predetermine the subject or even the exact text of any
amendment that is to be "proposed" by the convention? The question
is essentially one of construing the intent of the applying state legisla-
ture: Does the applying legislature wish its application to be counted as
one seeking a convention if that convention will have final authority to
determine the amendments to be proposed?
The hypothetical state application with which Professor Van Al-
styne ends his correspondence obscures this critical issue, for it pro-
vides scant basis for determining whether the hypothetical legislature-
which seeks a convention "for the purpose of" proposing a specific
amendment-would favor or oppose calling an article V convention
authorized to make its own final judgment concerning what amend-
ments to propose. As I noted in my earlier article, "[tlhe use of the
phrase 'for the purpose of' is not necessarily inconsistent with recogni-
tion by the applying legislature that the convention would be free to
consider other amendments." 9 Having no knowledge of the context in
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which this future hypothetical application might be brought forward
(or of what the settled professional opinion might then be about these
issues), one cannot confidently speculate about the assumptions made
by such a legislature. My answer to Professor Van Alstyne's hypotheti-
cal is intended to emphasize that an application is not necessarily in-
valid simply because it is accompanied by a suggested amendment, as
long as the applying legislature understands its proposed amendment
only to have the force of a recommendation.
It is important to note, however, that most of the applications pres-
ently pending in the real world are free from this ambiguity. With only
one or two exceptions, they apply for the calling of a convention for the
sole and exclusive purpose of proposing an amendment the exact text
of which is set out in the applications. These applications implicitly,
and still others by express provision,' 0 make it clear that they are op-
posed to a "Convention for proposing Amendments" if such a conven-
tion is empowered to determine for itself what amendments to propose.
Professor Van Alstyne considers such applications to be valid. I do
not.' I
10. The North Carolina application, for example, sets out the exact text of thb amendment it
proposes and explicitly provides that "this application and request be deemed rescinded in the
event that the convention is not limited to the subject matter of this application." N.C.S.J. Res. 5
(1979), reprinted in 125 CONG. REc. S1123 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1979).
11. Professor Van Alstyne would have Congress act upon a sufficient number of such appli-
cations by calling a convention and imposing upon that convention whatever strictures of subject
matter or predrafted text had been sought by 34 identical applications. I would not have Congress
act upon such applications, since they call only for a convention shackled by constraints that
Congress has no power to impose, and since they expressly or by implication oppose the calling of
a convention on any other basis.
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